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Abstract: 
 
In recent years there has been a significant shift in retirement income provision in the UK 
from defined benefit pensions schemes to defined contribution. This paper uses data from 
a survey of members of a mid-sized UK DC pension scheme to explore the attitudes and 
knowledge of employees faced with saving and investment choices in their pension plan. 
The results are mostly consistent with previous US findings in that many employees 
show limited knowledge and interest in their pension arrangements. The key difference is 
that UK members do not appear to have the enthusiasm for own-company stock found in 
the US. The UK members also display a high level of conviction that owning property is 
a better means of providing for retirement than investing in financial assets. 
 
 2
1. Introduction 
 
Most occupational pension plans operate on either a defined benefit (“DB”) or a defined 
contribution (“DC”) basis.1 In recent years there has been a significant shift in retirement 
income provision in the UK from the situation where employers offer DB schemes, to a 
situation where DC schemes are more common (e.g. NAPF 2003). This follows a similar 
trend in the US (e.g. Friedberg and Owyang 2002).  
 
Saving for retirement is a complex task and the stakes – ensuring an adequate income in 
retirement - are high. The move from DB to DC pensions puts much more responsibility 
into the hands of the individual participants, principally in terms of how much to save and 
how to invest the resulting funds. There is evidence that many people struggle to deal 
with this greater responsibility. For example, the US Retirement Confidence Survey 
(EBRI 2003) reports only 37% of respondents had tried to calculate how much money 
they should save for retirement, while 42% of the respondents in a survey of US DC 
pension plan participants conducted by the John Hancock insurance company (2003)  
said they had little or no investment knowledge.  
 
This paper uses data from a survey of the members of a mid-sized UK DC pension 
scheme to explore the attitudes and knowledge of individual employees faced with saving 
and investment choices in their pension plan. The main contribution of the paper is to 
compare and contrast UK case study evidence with existing US findings, including 
analysis of areas where there are differences between the UK and the US in the structure 
of DC pensions. The results are mostly consistent with previous US findings in that many 
employees show limited knowledge and interest in their pension arrangements. The key 
difference is that UK members do not appear to have the enthusiasm for own-company 
stock found in the US. The UK members also display a high level of conviction that 
owning property is a better means of providing for retirement than investing in financial 
assets 
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the previous 
literature on employee decision making in DC pension schemes. Section 3 describes the 
survey method, while Section 4 provides the survey results and analysis. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. Previous Literature on DC Pensions 
 
Survey evidence that many people struggle to understand and deal with the choices they 
face when saving for retirement is consistent with the principles of behavioural 
economics, which suggest individuals often do not make decisions in the rational, well-
informed and unbiased manner assumed by standard economic theory. For example, 
Mullainathan and Thaler (2000) claim there are ‘bounds’ to human rationality and self-
control and these bounds can have a significant effect on decision-making, including in 
saving for retirement. Mitchell and Utkus (2004) note “being good at retirement saving” 
requires accurate estimates of uncertain quantities such as lifetime earnings, asset returns, 
tax rates, health status and longevity. Casual inspection of models designed to help with 
this problem such as those proposed by Blake et al (2001) and Hibbert and Mowbray 
(2002) show the calculations are far from trivial and many of the parameters highly 
uncertain.  
 
A wide range of behavioural traits has been documented in the context of DC pension 
schemes. For example, Benartzi and Thaler (2002) argue that most members have 
weakly-defined investment preferences and that, as a result, investment choice in DC 
schemes is of limited value. Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) discuss what they call the 
“status quo bias”, whereby individuals stick with their initial choices even where they 
have cause to make a change. In a DC context, this manifests itself in 72% of the 
members of the TIAA/CREF pension scheme making no changes to their asset allocation 
despite an average tenure in the scheme of 12 years.  
 
There is also evidence that investors with DC pension plans display attitudes to risk and 
portfolio construction that are at odds with accepted investment principles. Some scheme 
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members appear to suffer from myopic loss aversion, seeking to avoid short-term losses, 
despite the long time horizon usually involved in planning for retirement (Benartzi and 
Thaler, 1999). Other findings include the use of ‘1/n heuristics’ whereby investors divide 
their contributions equally amongst the ‘n’ funds on offer, with little regard to the 
underlying asset composition of the funds. (Benartzi and Thaler, 2001).  
 
Perhaps most worryingly, several studies, e.g. Benartzi (2001), find DC scheme members 
in the US investing high proportions of their pension assets in the stock of their employer, 
despite the risk implications this has. VanDerhei (2002) notes that the percentages 
invested in company stock are partly explained by the requirement in some schemes for 
employer contributions to be invested in company stock. On the other hand, Benartzi (op. 
cit.) finds significant numbers of employees voluntarily holding high proportions of 
company stock in their 401(k) accounts. This may be explained by an endorsement effect, 
with members following company matching contributions made in stock, naïve 
extrapolation of past performance, or a desire to ‘invest in the familiar’ (Huberman, 
2001). 
  
The studies discussed above provide significant evidence that the investment strategies 
employed in self-directed retirement plans are often at odds with standard investment 
theory and suggest this can be explained, at least in part, by well-documented behavioural 
biases. While much of the evidence is based on experimental work, survey data, or 
relatively small samples, the consistency of the findings creates a convincing overall 
picture. The following sections seek to add to the picture by considering evidence from 
the UK.  
 
3. Survey Outline 
 
Data was collected by sending a questionnaire to the members of a mid-sized 
occupational pension scheme. The scheme that participated in the survey (hereafter “the 
scheme”) is sponsored by a long-established professional services company based in the 
South-East of England, which is now a subsidiary of a US-listed company. 
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The scheme is set up on an occupational money purchase basis, with a board of trustees 
overseeing the affairs on behalf of members. At the date of survey it had a total of 1118 
members, of which 484 were “active” members still employed by the company and the 
remaining 634 were “deferred” members no longer employed by the company, but with 
preserved pension rights. The total assets of the scheme amounted to £17.5m. 
 
Membership of the scheme is open to all permanent employees working more than 15 
hours a week and to all temporary employees with contracts of 6 months or longer. The 
minimum employee contribution is 4.5% of salary, with the employer contributing an 
additional 6.0%. The scheme is not contracted out of the second state pension. 
 
Employees have a choice of three main investment options, graded according to risk. The 
“Aggressive” option (Fund A) is approximately 90% equity and 10% fixed interest, while 
the “Balanced” option (Fund B) is 80% equity and 20% fixed interest, and the 
“Conservative” option (Fund C) is 65% equity and 35% fixed interest. Fund B is the 
default option, which is adopted if the employee does not make a choice. The same fund 
manager manages all three funds. Additionally, members over the age of 50 have the 
option of investing all or part of their assets in a fund that is 100% fixed interest. 
However, there is no automatic ‘lifestyle’ option that will switch assets as the member 
approaches retirement. 
 
All members have the option to make additional voluntary contributions up to applicable 
legislative limits. These may be contributed to the main scheme investment options, to a 
chosen range of externally managed funds, or to a freestanding AVC arrangement of the 
member’s choice. 
 
The distribution of scheme assets is shown in Table 1. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
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The survey questionnaire was sent out along with each member’s statutory money 
purchase illustration – a mandatory projection of likely retirement income sent to all DC 
pension scheme members each year by their scheme. A covering letter from the scheme’s 
senior trustee asked for the member’s help in completing the questionnaire, but no 
inducement was offered and no deadline set for return. The questionnaire asked about 
retirement income expectations and savings rates in the context of existing evidence that 
many people struggle to save enough for retirement (Laibson et al 1998, Thaler and 
Benartzi 2004). It also asked a number of questions about investment preferences and 
knowledge, similar in nature to those used by John Hancock (2003) in the US. Finally, 
the questionnaire also collected basic portfolio, pension contribution and demographic 
information.2  
 
A total of 161 useable responses were received, representing a response rate of 14.4%. 
The response rate for active members was higher at 19.0%. In the context of a consumer 
survey using a lengthy questionnaire (5 pages) on what many people regard as a ‘dry’ 
subject, this can be argued to be a reasonable response rate. 
 
A breakdown of the characteristics of the membership of the scheme and the 
corresponding figures for the respondents are shown in Table 2. The nature of the firm 
means the membership of the pension scheme has certain biases relative to the general 
working population. In particular, it is predominantly male (78%), older (average age 
43.5 years) and more highly paid (average salary of active members of £35,000) than the 
UK working population at large.3  
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
In turn, the respondent group has certain biases relative to the overall membership of the 
scheme. The respondents are mainly males (89%) who on average are 2.2 years older and 
earn £4,300 per annum more than the typical scheme member. The potential implications 
of the demographic profile of the scheme and the respondents for the interpretation of the 
results are discussed later in the paper. 
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4. Survey Results 
 
4.1 Retirement Expectations 
 
Most respondents expect to retire at either 60 or 65 and to rely mainly on their 
occupational pension(s) to provide a retirement income of between 50% and 74% of their 
current income. (Data not reported) However, there are also a significant number of 
respondents who expect a retirement income of less than half the amount they currently 
earn. Few respondents expect to defer retirement beyond age 65, despite media 
commentary about the effects of longevity and the need for many employees to work 
later in life to ensure an adequate retirement income. The respondents’ retirement 
expectations should be viewed in the context of the savings rate data discussed in section 
4.3 below. 
 
4.2 Advice 
 
One way in which employees may be able to avoid making inappropriate choices in their 
DC pension schemes is to take advice. However, only 59% of respondents report having 
received advice about their pension. It is more common for older and higher earning 
respondents to report having had advice. The proportion of respondents over age 50 who 
have had advice is 69%, compared to 52% of those under 50. The chi-square statistic for 
the difference is 4.90, which is significant at the 5% level. (df = 1; p-value = 0.027)  
Similarly, the proportion of respondents earning over £40,000 who report having had 
advice at 72% significantly exceeds the proportion (45%) of those earning less than 
£40,000 (chi-square = 11.15; df = 1; p = 0.001). 
 
 Of those who have received advice, the most common source relied on was an 
independent financial adviser – 73% had relied on advice from an IFA at least 
“moderately”. (Table 3) The next most common source of advice was the member’s 
employer, with 55% of those having received advice relying on this source at least 
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moderately. It is perhaps unsurprising that so many people report relying on their 
employer in this way, but also worth noting that the employer will not have been 
authorised to provide advice as defined by the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. 
It is more likely that the employer provided generic information, rather than advice 
tailored to the specific circumstances of the member.  
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
Relatively few respondents report having relied on other sources of advice. For example, 
only one third of respondents report relying at least moderately on advice from friends 
and family members or from TV and newspaper articles, while even fewer relied on 
financial services companies. Again, the point must be made that some of these sources 
will have provided generic information rather than specific advice. While the UK 
Government has announced intentions to develop an online pensions planning tool (DWP 
2004), few respondents have made much use of what is already available on the Internet. 
Of the respondents who had received advice, 79% had not relied on an online source at 
all and only 16% had relied on an online source at least moderately. 
 
There is some evidence that advice influences members’ opinions about retirement 
saving.4 In a number of cases responses differ significantly between the group that has 
received advice and the group that has not. Those who have had advice are more likely to 
have calculated the amount they need to save for retirement and to report the 
corresponding figure as being above 10% of salary. There are fewer significant 
differences in terms of responses to the investment questions. The differences – and chi-
square tests where relevant - are reported in more detail in the corresponding sections 
below. 
  
4.3 Saving Levels 
 
The move from DB to DC raises important questions about whether employees are 
saving enough for retirement – in contrast to DB where the likely pension in relation to 
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final salary is often quite clear. However, more than half of respondents report they have 
never tried to work out how much they need to save for retirement or that they have tried, 
but were unable to work it out (45% and 8% respectively). (Table 4) The balance of 
responses varies significantly between those who have received advice and those who 
have not: only 26% of the former group have not tried to calculate how much they need 
to save, but the corresponding figure for the latter group is 78% (chi-square = 30.39; df = 
1;  p-value = 0.000). 
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
Most respondents appear to have a realistic view of the amount they will need to save for 
retirement, although given the response to the previous question it is not clear what many 
of them base their view on. Three quarters of respondents state they should be saving 
10% or more of income, with 38% opting for a savings rate in excess of 15%. On the 
other hand, 16% of respondents think a savings rate below 9% will be adequate, while 
8% say they do not know what the correct savings rate is. Again, there is significant 
variation between those who have received advice and those who have not. A required 
savings rate in excess of 10% is cited by 88% of respondents who have had advice, but 
this drops to 57% for those who have not had advice (Chi-square = 20.34; df = 1; p-value 
= 0.000). It appears that many of the respondents who have not had advice underestimate 
the amount they need to save. 
 
By way of comparison, DB schemes designed to produce pensions of between half and 
two-thirds of final salary after 40 years service, tend to have average total (i.e. employee 
and employer) contribution rates of 15-18% of salary. (Blake 2003) It is worth bearing in 
mind the standard terms of the scheme provide a savings rate at the lower end of the 
range chosen by most respondents, with the employee contribution of 4.5% matched with 
an employer contribution of 6.0%. The employees do, though, have the option of making 
additional voluntary contributions, paying into stakeholder pensions where eligible, and 
building up savings outside their pension arrangements.5 The survey did not gather any 
information on the extent to which they are doing this. 
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Most respondents note they are currently saving too little for retirement – an answer 
chosen by 57% of respondents. A further 18% state they “don’t know” if they are 
currently saving enough for retirement, while 25% of respondents think they are saving 
the correct amount. The proportion saying they are saving too little does not vary by 
much depending on whether the respondent reports having received advice. However, the 
proportion of those who have had advice who say they are saving the correct amount 
(31%) is more than twice as high as the proportion of those who haven’t had advice 
(15%). Respondents who haven’t had advice are more likely to state they are unsure if 
they are saving enough (29% vs. 11%).  
 
Of those who say they are not saving enough, over 64% state this is either because they 
don’t earn enough or because they have other financial priorities. A distrust of pensions 
or lack of interest in financial matters is the reason for not saving enough cited by 17% of 
respondents, while 11% say they are not saving enough now because they plan to save 
more in future. 
 
Over half (56%) of those who state they are not saving enough say they plan to keep their 
pension contributions unchanged over the next year, while 32% plan to increase their 
contributions and 12% are unsure what they will do. For the one third of respondents who 
plan to take action to raise their savings rate, it is worth bearing in mind research done in 
the US, e.g. Choi et al (2002), which casts doubt on the extent to which employees follow 
through with stated intentions to change their retirement savings behaviour.  
 
Thaler and Benartzi (2004) propose a prescriptive savings plan called “Save More 
Tomorrow” - or “SMartT” – where employees with low saving rates commit in advance 
to allocate a portion of future salary increases towards retirement saving.6 This approach 
plays to the common desire to avoid reductions in nominal take home pay – driven by 
loss aversion and money illusion – and the systematic conflict between long-term and 
short-term preferences, whereby individuals often assume they will be willing to do 
something in future they are reluctant to do today. (Laibson et al 1998) Furthermore, the 
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status quo bias identified by Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) means once the initial 
commitment is made, few people make the effort to change it.  
 
Implementation of the SMarT plan at a mid-sized manufacturing firm in the US showed 
considerable success in raising savings rates amongst employees who rejected immediate 
action to raise their pension contributions. The survey results also suggests the approach 
could be effective, with almost 60% of the respondents who say they are not saving 
enough saying they would be prepared to make a commitment to allocate a proportion of 
future salary rises to increasing their saving rate. This includes 43% of those who state 
they plan to make no change in their contributions in the next year and 60% of those who 
are unsure whether they will change their contributions in the next year. In this context, it 
is notable that the UK Department for Work and Pensions (DWP 2004) has highlighted 
the idea of employees committing to ‘save more tomorrow’ as part of their agenda for 
improving retirement provision by promoting “informed choice”.  
 
4.4 Investment Issues 
 
In terms of investment matters, the most common response is for members to state they 
are “moderately knowledgeable” (42%). For the remainder, slightly more respondents  
(33%) say they are “not very” or “not at all” knowledgeable than say they are “fairly” or 
“very knowledgeable” (25%). (Table 5) The profile of self-reported knowledge is broadly 
similar to the John Hancock (2003) survey results for the US.  
 
Questions designed to test understanding of basic features of investment present a mixed 
picture. Nearly 70% of respondents were able to answer correctly a question relating to 
the effects of compound interest – an important aspect of long-term saving. However, far 
fewer (29%) were able to identify that the value of fixed income securities would be 
likely to fall if long-term interest rates rise. A key part of the investment choice available 
to members is to choose between funds that differ in terms of their asset allocation 
between equities and bonds – a choice that may be difficult for members who are 
unfamiliar with the basic characteristics of these types of investments. Those who have 
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had advice perform slightly better than those who have not, but still only 33% of them 
identify the correct answer to the fixed interest question. (Chi-square = 2.28; df = 1; p-
value = 0.131) These results are consistent with previous US and UK studies (e.g. John 
Hancock 2003, Watson Wyatt 2004). 
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
Choi et al (op. cit.) discuss how members of US retirement plans tend to take the “path of 
least resistance” – adopting default options and making few active choices. In this 
scheme 54% of respondents note they prefer to make the decisions about which funds to 
invest in themselves, whereas 46% would prefer someone else to make the decisions for 
them. Furthermore, 48% of respondents describe the investment funds in their pension as 
being an active choice they made, while 52% of respondents say they accepted the 
scheme default option. (Table 6) This indicates that a significantly higher proportion of 
respondents are prepared to make an active choice than is typically the case in UK 
pension schemes. For example, consultancy Hewitt Bacon and Woodrow reports that 
about 80% of members of group personal pension schemes in the UK tend to accept the 
default option. (Bridgeland 2002) However, it is also the case that about 80% of the 
assets of the scheme are in the default ‘Balanced’ fund, meaning many of those who 
exercised active choice still decided this fund was the most appropriate for them. It is 
worth noting that the structure of the scheme – with three funds labelled “A - 
Aggressive”, “B - Balanced”, and “C - Conservative” - may lead investors to choose the 
balanced fund – i.e. the middle option - on the basis of the “extremeness aversion” 
discussed by Benartzi and Thaler (2002). 
 
Most respondents (65%) state that the range of options available in the scheme – three 
core options, a gilt fund for employees over 50, and external AVC arrangements – is 
about right. Just fewer than 10% of respondents state the range is too narrow, with only 
2% stating it is too broad. It is notable that many schemes in the US and significant 
numbers in the UK offer a considerably wider investment choice to members (e.g. 
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Myners 2001 p100). It appears the majority of members in this scheme see little need for 
this.  
 
[Table 6 here] 
 
A relatively large number of respondents (23%) state they do not know what the 
investment options are. In light of this it is also notable that only about half of the 
respondents provided information about which of the fund options they were invested in. 
It may be that they were reluctant to provide this information because they regarded it as 
sensitive. However, other sensitive information such as age and income was provided by 
99% of respondents, casting doubt on this explanation. An alternative explanation is that 
the information was not provided because the respondents found it difficult to recall or 
locate. If this is the case, the lack of this information may be a handicap to these members 
in assessing the ongoing suitability of their fund allocation. 
 
In terms of managing the investment choices they have made, two thirds of respondents 
state they review the investments in their pension scheme at least every three years, with 
48% doing so at least annually. However, at the other end of the scale, the remaining 
third review their choices less than once every five years, or not at all. Those who do 
review their choice regularly make few changes as a result – 36% make changes less than 
once every five years and a further 43% never make any changes, consistent with the 
status quo bias noted by Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988). 
 
Respondents were asked to state the extent to which they thought particular asset classes 
were appropriate for saving for their retirement. The results of the question – reflecting 
the average score on a 1-to-5 scale where 1 is “Not at all appropriate” and 5 is “Very 
Appropriate” are shown in Table 7. The table also shows the percentage of respondents 
who state each asset class is either “fairly” or “very” appropriate. Investment in property 
attracts the highest scores, with 83% of respondents saying they think owning their own 
home is either a fairly or very appropriate way of saving for retirement and 77% saying 
the same about other investments in property. This compares to 52% for UK equity funds 
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and 50% for UK Gilts. This is consistent with figures quoted in PPI (2004), which show 
significant numbers of people using property as a retirement saving vehicle and 13% 
expecting property to be their main source of retirement income.  
 
[Table 7 here] 
 
The preference for investment in residential and other property can to be viewed in the 
context of the criteria the respondents note as influencing their choice of investments. 
While 29% note their choice is influenced most by the recommendation of their adviser, 
and 9% by the level of charges, 50% state that the most influential factor is the 
performance record of the investment. (Table 8) The strong performance of property over 
recent years when the stock market has had poor returns may explain why many 
respondents view property as the most appropriate long-term investment. However, there 
is no statistically significant relationship between the criteria regarded as most important 
and the respondent’s scoring of the various asset classes.  
 
[Table 8 here] 
 
Several aspects of the respondents’ investment preferences appear rational. An 
understanding of the benefits of diversification is evident in the relatively low scores 
assigned to individual shares and particularly own-company stock. Equally, cash is given 
one of the lowest scores, contrary to the view that individual pension fund investors often 
show ‘myopic loss aversion’ by favouring stable, but low return, assets. (Benartzi and 
Thaler 1999) For most asset classes there is relatively little difference between the views 
of the respondents who have had advice and views of those who have not. The group that 
has had advice is, however, more disposed towards equity investment: 60% state UK 
equity funds are a fairly or very appropriate way of saving for retirement, compared to 
38% of the group who haven’t had advice (chi-square = 7.08; df = 1; p-value = 0.008). 
For overseas equities the corresponding figures are 37.3% and 20.4% (chi-square = 3.31; 
df = 1; p-value = 0.069).    
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There is an argument that DC pension fund asset allocation should vary with age, with 
higher weightings in risky assets (i.e. equities) at younger ages, and lower risk strategies 
(bonds) as retirement approaches. This is often known as the “lifecycle” approach and 
has the objective of reducing the risk of losses close to retirement when there is little 
scope to recover from them.7 (Bodie 2003) The scheme offers a fixed income fund for the 
use of members over the age of 50 years to enable them to adopt this approach. The older 
scheme members do appear to have a more favourable view of bond investment with 
61% of respondents over the age of 50 saying gilts are either a fairly or very appropriate 
way of saving for their retirement, compared to 42% of respondents under 50 years of age 
(chi-square = 5.33; df = 1; p-value = 0.021). However, there are no other significant 
differences in asset class preferences between those aged under 50 and those aged over 
50. Notably, the higher score assigned to gilts by older respondents is not mirrored in a 
lower score being assigned to equities. 
 
In the US many DC pension plans have high levels of investment in the shares of the 
sponsoring employer. The 1990 Social Security Act limits self-investment by UK pension 
funds to 5% of assets, meaning the issue has not become significant here. The survey 
results show that relatively few respondents view the idea of investing their pension 
assets in the stock of the scheme sponsor as attractive. (Table 9) Only 12% stated it was 
either fairly or very attractive, while 30% stated it was not very attractive and a further 
34% stated it was not at all attractive. Active members were only marginally more 
enthusiastic about this prospect than deferred members. If the option to invest in the 
employer’s stock were available, 51% of respondents indicated they would not put any 
part of their fund into it. A further 23% would allocate 5% or less. However, it is still 
notable that 18% of respondents would be prepared to put more than 10% of their 
pension fund assets into their employer’s stock. For these investors, limited 
diversification appears to be outweighed by the attraction of investing in the familiar. 
 
[Table 9 here] 
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4.5 Discussion of Results 
 
Overall, the survey depicts a situation where most of the employees are relying on their 
DC occupational pension for a retirement income that they expect to be comparable with 
what the best quality DB schemes have achieved. Most of them have realistic 
expectations about how much they will need to save to achieve this, but also note that 
their current saving level falls short of this. While many have received advice about their 
pension, a significant minority have not and this has to be viewed against the fact that the 
respondents do not regard themselves as particularly knowledgeable about investment 
matters and that many struggle to answer questions on basic aspects of investment. 
  
The respondents’ investment preferences look quite rational in the context of retirement 
planning, albeit with the support for property possibly reflecting a tendency to favour 
asset classes that have gone up in the recent past. It is also interesting to note that the 
employees are mostly satisfied with what – by the standards of many US schemes and 
some UK schemes – is quite a narrow range of investment options.  
 
The important question is what conclusions can be drawn from the survey for improving 
the support provided to employees with occupational pensions in general and DC 
pensions in particular? That many employees have not sought advice on their own 
suggests increased provision of advice in, or via, the workplace could be helpful. The 
downside – of course – is that the cost to the employer of making this provision is likely 
to be substantial, particularly where advice must come from regulated investment 
advisers. Against this background, it is encouraging that the DWP (2004) has pledged to 
investigate the extent to which current legislation prevents employers from playing a 
greater role in encouraging and helping employees to save for retirement. 
 
Consistent with the US evidence, the survey shows many members lack the knowledge or 
interest to make active choices in their pension plan. For them, the important thing is that 
the default options – the path of least resistance – are well chosen and appropriate, 
particularly in the absence of more general provision of advice. This puts pressure on 
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trustees and pensions managers to consider carefully the needs of the members as they 
decide on these options. 8 
 
It is interesting that the respondents lack interest in investing in their employer’s stock, 
given that self-investment is a significant characteristic of many US DC plans. Benartzi 
(2001) has argued that payment of employer contributions in the form of stock creates an 
endorsement effect and it may be that the absence of this endorsement – i.e. stock is not 
even offered as an option – has an influence on the employees’ preferences.  
 
In contrast, the strong views expressed about the attractiveness of property may be of 
more concern. Most employees will already have significant exposure to property 
through home ownership and additions to this are likely to result in poor diversification. 
It is also possible that the preference for (residential) property will encourage members to 
save for retirement outside of formal pension arrangements, which has disadvantages in 
terms of tax treatment, with no tax relief on the funds that are invested and – other than in 
the case of the member’s main residence - taxation of the returns on the investment. 
Furthermore, someone using their own home as a means of saving for retirement will 
require either to move house on retirement to downsize or undertake some form of equity 
release. Both of these mechanisms may appear more attractive in prospect than when the 
time finally comes to put them into effect. PPI (2004) discusses some of the practical 
difficulties of drawing an income from property investment, including the limited 
proportion of value that can be taken via equity release.  
 
While the survey provides evidence to consider in relation to existing US findings, there 
are – of course – limitations to the conclusions that can be drawn. The response is drawn 
from only one scheme where the members have particular characteristics and face 
particular choices and circumstances. Furthermore, like any survey it relies on self-
reported information, with no way of knowing how accurate it is.9 The survey must also 
be interpreted without knowing about the broader financial circumstances and investment 
holdings of the respondents. 
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As noted earlier, the membership of the scheme has certain biases relative to the working 
population at large and the self-selection of the respondents exacerbates these biases. It 
could be argued that older and more highly-paid (and more highly-educated) employees 
are more likely to be interested in, and knowledgeable about, their pension arrangements 
than the average employee. To the extent that this is true, the results of the survey should 
be taken as an upwardly biased view of the level of knowledge and interest in investment 
matters amongst employees with DC pensions. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper provides a case study view of the attitudes and beliefs of investors within a 
UK DC pension plan, which can be contrasted with existing US evidence. The results are 
broadly consistent with the US findings in that many employees show limited knowledge 
and interest in their pension arrangements. They make the case for broader provision of 
investment advice in the workplace and for ongoing care in choosing pension scheme 
default options in the knowledge that many employees will accept them. There is also 
some support for the effectiveness of ‘paternalistic’ programs with behavioural 
underpinnings – such as ‘Save More Tomorrow’. Interesting differences appear with US 
results, principally in terms of the attractiveness of investing retirement assets in the 
employer’s stock and in the choice between property and financial assets. But these 
results are drawn from one set of employees in one particular scheme. There is clear 
scope to extend the work to other schemes in the UK and beyond. As DC pensions 
become more common it will be important we know how to structure them and how to 
support the scheme members in order to maximise their chances of enjoying comfortable 
retirement incomes. 
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Table 1 – Allocation of Scheme Assets 
 
Fund % of Scheme Assets Fund Asset Allocation 
Fund A – Aggressive 10.3% 90% Equities; 10% Bonds 
Fund B – Balanced 77.0% 80% Equities; 20% Bonds 
Fund C – Conservative 2.2% 65% Equities; 35% Bonds 
Gilt Fund 6.5% 100% Bonds 
External AVC Funds 4.1% Various 
 
The gilt fund is only available to members over the age of 50. Fund B is the default fund. 
AVC stands for additional voluntary contributions. The scheme offers a number of external funds for 
these contributions – mainly managed by insurance companies.  
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Table 2 - Scheme and Respondent Demographic Information 
 
 Active Deferred Total 
Scheme: Members 484 634 1118 
 Male 372 499 871 
 % Male 76.9% 78.7% 77.9% 
 Female 112 135 247 
 % Female 23.1% 21.3% 22.1% 
 Average Age 43.4 43.5 43.5 
 Average Tenure 5.9 8.8 7.6 
 Average Salary £35,079 £25,547 £30,483 
    
Respondents: Members 92 66 161 
 Male 80 60 143 
 % Male 87.0% 90.9% 88.8% 
 Female 12 5 17 
 % Female 13.0% 7.6% 10.6% 
 Average Age 47.2 46.2 45.7 
 Average Tenure 7.2 7.4 7.3 
 Average Salary £39,348 £40,846 £39,938 
    
 Total Response Rate 19.0% 10.4% 14.4% 
 Male Response Rate 21.5% 12.0% 16.4% 
 Female Response Rate 10.7% 3.7% 6.9% 
    
Difference: Male 10.1% 12.2% 10.9% 
 Female -10.1% -13.7% -11.5% 
 Average Age 3.8 2.7 2.2 
 Average Tenure 1.3 -1.4 -0.3 
 Average Salary £ £4,269 £15,299 £9,455 
 Average Salary % 12.2% 59.9% 31.0% 
 
“Difference” is the respondents value minus the corresponding figure for scheme. The salary figures for deferred 
members under “scheme” are unreliable as they reflect each employee’s salary immediately prior to leaving the 
employer rather than the employee’s current salary, which is not known. The total salary figure is also unreliable as it 
contains figures for deferred members. Three respondents failed to indicate whether they were still employed by the 
company and one deferred member returned the form complete except for the indication of sex. 
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Table 3 – Sources of Pensions Advice Relied on by Respondents 
 
     1 
Not  
at all 
2 
Not 
Much 
3 
Moder-
ately 
4 
Quite 
a lot 
5 
Very 
much 
Average 
Score 
 
Employer  24.2%  20.9% 35.2% 17.65% 2.2% 2.5 
Independent Financial Adviser 20.0% 6.7% 32.2% 32.2% 8.9% 3.0 
Other Professional Adviser 70.3% 7.7% 12.1% 8.8% 1.1% 1.6 
Bank / Building Society  81.3% 8.8% 8.8% 1.1%   0.0%  1.3 
Insurance / Investment Company 87.8% 6.7% 4.4% 1.1%   0.0%  1.2 
Friend or Family member 65.6% 4.4% 18.9% 11.1%   0.0%  1.8 
Internet / Online resource 78.9% 5.6% 10.0% 5.6%   0.0%  1.4 
TV / Newspaper feature  58.9% 8.9% 24.4% 7.8%   0.0%  1.8 
 
Responses to the question “To what extent did you rely on advice about your pension from the following sources?” - % of 
respondents who reported receiving advice from any source. (N=91) Average score formed by coding responses from 1 for 
“Not at all” through to 5 for “Very much”. 
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Table 4 – Respondents’ Views on Savings Rates 
 
a. Have you ever tried to calculate how much you need to save for retirement?  
           All  (Advice) 
 Yes - I have done this on my own   25.2%    (30.9%) 
 Yes - with the help of an adviser   20.1%   (33.0%) 
 Yes - using an online resource / the internet    2.5%    (2.1%) 
 Yes - but I was unable to work it out    7.6%   (9.6%)  
 No - I have not tried to do this   44.7%   (24.5%)  (N=159) 
 
b. What percentage of your income do you think you should be saving for retirement (including any 
contribution your employer makes)? 
 
 Up to 5%          1.3%   (0.0%) 
 5%-to-9%      15.1%   (8.5%) 
 10%-to-14%      37.1%   (40.4%) 
 More than 15%     38.4%   (47.9%) 
 Don’t know          8.2%   (3.2%)  (N=159) 
 
c. Given your desired level of income in retirement, do you think: 
    
 You are saving too much       0.6%   (1.1%) 
 You are saving the correct amount    24.5%    (30.9%) 
 You are saving too little     56.6%   (57.5%) 
 You don’t know if you are saving enough   18.2%  (10.6%)  (N=159) 
 
d. What is the main barrier to you saving enough? 
 
 Don’t earn enough     22.7%   (25.0%) 
 Have other financial priorities    42.0%   (38.6%) 
 Plan to save more in future    11.4%   (15.9%) 
 Don’t trust pensions     15.9%   (11.4%) 
 Lack of interest in financial matters     1.1%  (2.3%) 
 Other            6.8%    (6.8%)  (N=88) 
 
e. Over the next year, do you plan to: 
    
 Increase what you pay into your pension   32.6%   (35.8%) 
 Keep the contributions you make unchanged   56.2%   (52.8%) 
 Decrease what you pay into your pension     0.0%   (0.0%) 
 Don’t know      11.2%   (11.3%)  (N=89) 
 
f. Would you be prepared to commit a portion of any future wage rises to increasing the amount you save – 
e.g. if you got a £100 rise, you would pay an extra £50 to your pension? 
 
 Yes        59.6%   (66.0%)  
 No        28.1%   (24.5%) 
 Don’t know       12.4%  (9.4%)  (N=89) 
 
The “Advice” column reflects responses from those employees who reported having received advice on their pension. 
Questions d, e, and f were answered only by respondents who answered, “You are saving too little” to question c. 
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Table 5 – Respondents’ Investment Knowledge 
 
a. How knowledgeable are you about investment matters? 
               All   (Advice)                               
 Not at all knowledgeable    1.9%   (1.1%) 
 Not very knowledgeable    31.1%    (22.3%) 
 Moderately knowledgeable   41.6%     (42.6%) 
 Fairly knowledgeable    23.6%      (30.9%) 
 Very knowledgeable    1.9%    (3.2%)   
 
b. If long-term interest rates were to rise, what effect do you think this would have on the value of a fund 
invested in fixed income securities (“Bonds”)? 
          
 Value of fund would rise    26.5%    (25.8%) 
 Value of fund would fall    28.8%    (33.3%) 
 Value of fund would stay the same   20.0%    (22.6%) 
 Don’t know     25.0%    (18.3%)   
 
c. If an investment earns a return of 7% per year, roughly how long do you think it will take for the value of 
that investment to double? 
          
 Five years       1.9%    (3.2%) 
 Ten years     68.6%    (75.3%) 
 Fifteen years     16.4%    (11.8%) 
 Twenty years       3.1%    (3.2%)  
 Don’t know     10.1%    (6.5%)  
 
% of all respondents. (N=161) 
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Table 6 – Respondents’ Views on Investment Choice 
 
a. As regards the investment choices in your pension scheme, do you prefer to: 
            All  (Advice) 
 Make the decisions yourself     53.8%   (58.1%) 
 Have someone else make the decisions for you   46.3%   (41.9%) 
 
b. Are the investment funds in your pension the result of: 
           
 An active choice you made     47.5%   (53.8%) 
 A default option set by the scheme     52.5%   (46.2%) 
 
c. How often do you review the investments in your pension fund?    
         
 More than once a year             5.0%    (6.5%) 
 Every year       43.1%    (48.4%) 
 Every two-to-three years      18.1%    (22.6%) 
 Every five years         0.6%    (0.0%) 
 Very occasionally (less than once every 5 years)   16.3%    (12.9%) 
 Never        16.9%  (9.7%) 
 
d. How often do you change the investments in your pension fund? 
           
 More than once a year        0.6%   (0.0%) 
 Every year         1.3%   (1.1%) 
 Every two-to-three years      18.1%   (25.8%) 
 Every five years         1.3%   (1.1%) 
 Very occasionally (less than once every 5 years)   36.3%   (37.6%) 
 Never        42.5%   (34.4%) 
 
e. Is the range of investment options in your pension scheme: 
         
 Too narrow – there are not enough options      9.4%   (9.7%) 
 About right       65.4%   (71.0%) 
 Too broad – there are too many options      1.9%    (0.0%) 
 I don’t know what the options are      23.3%   (19.4%) 
 
% of all respondents. (N=160) 
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Table 7 – Respondents’ Views on the Appropriateness  
of Different Asset Classes for Retirement Saving 
 
   Advice Age 
 Average 
Score 
Total No Yes <50 years >50 years 
Cash 2.5 22.2% 22.2% 22.2% 20.9% 24.6% 
       
Govt Bonds 3.5 49.7% 49.2% 50.0% 41.4% 60.7%* 
       
Corp. Bonds 3.1 32.4% 30.5% 33.7% 30.7% 33.9% 
       
UK Equities 3.5 51.7% 38.3% 60.4%* 47.8% 56.7% 
       
Overseas Equities 3.0 30.0% 21.7% 35.6% 28.9% 30.5% 
       
Individual Shares 2.8 24.8% 22.0% 26.7% 21.6% 30.0% 
       
Employer’s Stock 2.4 11.7% 12.7% 11.0% 9.9% 14.5% 
       
Property 4.1 76.8% 77.4% 76.3% 78.0% 76.2% 
       
Own Home 4.3 82.8% 87.5% 79.6% 87.1% 77.8% 
 
Responses to the question “How appropriate do you think the following asset classes for saving for your retirement?” 
Average score is based on scale 1 = “not all appropriate” through to 5 “very appropriate”. Percentage figures are  % of 
respondents saying asset class is either a “fairly” or “very” appropriate. Total reflects all respondents (N=160)  
 
Responses are split (1) between those who report receiving advice and those who way they have not had advice, and (2) 
between those aged under 50 years and those aged over 50 years. 
  
* - indicates significant difference at 5% level using chi-square test (df=1). 
 
 
 
Table 8 – Factors Influencing Respondents’ Investment Choice 
 
Which factor most influences your choice of investments for your pension fund? 
            All  (Advice) 
 Level of charges and fees        8.9%   (7.5%) 
 Performance record of the investment    49.7%   (50.5%) 
 Recommendation of my adviser     29.3%   (34.4%) 
 Brochure / marketing information       5.7%   (4.3%) 
 Other           6.4%   (3.2%) 
 
% of all respondents. N=157 
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Table 9 – Respondents’ Views on Investment in Own Company Stock 
 
a. If you were given the option of investing some of your pension fund in [your employer’s] shares – that is 
those of your employer - how attractive would this be to you? 
       All   (Advice) 
 Not at all attractive    34.2%   (34.4%) 
 Not very attractive    29.7%    (30.0%) 
 Moderately attractive    24.5%    (23.3%) 
 Fairly attractive       6.5%    (6.7%) 
 Very attractive       5.2%    (5.6%)  (N=155) 
 
b. If the option of investing in [your employer’s] shares were available, what percentage of your fund 
would you allocate to this option?    
      
 0% of my fund      50.7%    (47.6%)   
 1 - 5% of my fund       22.5%   (22.6%)     
 6 - 10% of my fund         9.2%   (9.5%)     
 11-20% of my fund         9.9%   (10.7%)     
 >20 % of my fund         7.8%   (9.5%)     (N=142) 
 
% of all respondents. The questions gave the name of the ultimate parent company, which is a US listed company. 
Question b required respondents to write in a figure, but the responses are shown in ranges for ease of reference. 
 
 29
 
                                                 
1 In a DB plan, an employee who qualifies for a pension will receive an income flow from the employer-
sponsored pension scheme from retirement until death. The annual benefit is typically a proportion of the 
employee’s final, or average, salary, with the proportion depending on length of tenure in the pension 
scheme. In contrast, in a DC scheme contributions are paid into the plan and the employee can usually 
choose from a range of investment options. The contributions, with accumulated investment returns, are 
then available to provide a retirement income, either directly or by purchasing an annuity. 
 
2 A copy of the survey is available from the author on request. 
 
3 Data from the Office of National Statistics show that in Q4 2003 56% of people in employment were 
male, that the mean age in the labour force in 2001 was 39, and that average gross annual pay for full time 
employees in the 2002/03 tax year was £25,170. (www.statistics.gov.uk) 
 
4 Alternatively, it may be that respondents with these particular characteristics are more likely to have 
sought advice. It is not possible to determine the direction of causality. 
 
5 Employees can pay AVCs provided these contributions together with their regular contributions do not 
exceed the legislative limit of 15% of earnings, with earnings capped at £102,000 (2004/05). Employees 
with an occupational pension scheme can also pay into a private ‘stakeholder’ pension scheme provided 
they do not earn more than £30,000 a year – an arrangement known as concurrency.  
 
6 “Save More Tomorrow” is a registered trade mark. 
 
7 Bodie (2003) argues that higher risk strategies are appropriate at younger ages 1) because young people 
have more of their wealth in ‘bond-like’ human capital and can afford to take more financial risk, and 2) 
because younger people have more flexibility to work more to make up for any shortfall created by losses 
in financial assets. 
 
8 For a discussion of the role of paternalism in retirement provision see Thaler R. & C. Sunstein (2003). 
 
9 UK data protection laws pose a significant barrier to studies comparing self-reported with administrative 
data at the level of individual employees. 
